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ABSTRACT
Environmental regulations such as carbon taxation and air quality standards can
lead to notable improvements in health outcomes and ambient air quality. However,
these types of policies may have significant impacts on the labor market, in particular
for workers in energy-intensive industries, especially if these workers have acquired
specific human capital in those industries. This dissertation focuses on the general
equilibrium consequences of environmental regulation on the labor market. Specifi-
cally, I examine costly reallocation of workers between sectors, the welfare effects of
involuntary unemployment, and the heterogeneous effects of this policy on different
types of workers. To this end, I develop a two-sector search model with sectoral hu-
man capital accumulation to explore the effects on the labor market of implementing
a per unit of energy use carbon tax in the US. I separate the economy into a high-
intensive sector (’dirty’) and a low-intensive sector (’clean’). I calibrate the model
using 2014 U.S. data. I find that a carbon tax increases total unemployment by 0.06
percentage points, decreases the dirty employment rate by 2.1 percent, and increases
the clean employment rate by 1.04 percent. Firms in the dirty sector adjust by de-
creasing the demand for high-skilled workers and increasing the number of vacancies
in the low-skilled market.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Greenhouse gas emissions in the United States are a rising concern because of their
negative impact on human health and on the environment. Carbon-emitting fuels,
such as coal, oil, and natural gas, provided 79 percent of the U.S. energy used in
the past decade. Curbing the use of carbon through either a carbon tax or a cap-
and-trade program is believed by many researchers to be the most efficient approach
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 1 Researchers also generally agree that these
types of environmental policies mitigate other negative externalities such as elevated
human mortality due to particulate matter air pollution.2
At the same time, the “jobs versus the environment” discussion, has been and still
is, a central part of the political debate regarding environmental regulations. In a
June 2017 speech, president Donald Trump said, “Compliance with the terms of the
Paris accord could cost America as much as 2.7 million jobs in 2025.” Understanding
the effects on the labor market is crucial to assess the true policy impact on the
economy.
Furthermore, there is a growing consensus from experts, both policymakers and
academics, that given global climate change, federal governments should take action.
In particular, the Climate Leadership Council (CLC) recently proposed that the U.S.
federal government should impose a carbon tax and that the revenue from that tax
should be returned uniformly to all individuals as a lump-sum transfer, a carbon
dividend.3 So understanding the effects that such a policy could have on the economy
1E.g., Baumol and Oates (1988)
2E.g., Levy et al. (2009); Tagaris et al. (2009); Fann et al. (2012)
3The CLC’s proposal has received the endorsement from more than 3500 economists, including
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and, in particular, on the labor markets, is crucial.
In this paper, I investigate the effects on the U.S. labor market of implementing
a per unit of energy use carbon tax. In particular, I propose a theoretical framework
to help us understand the costly reallocation of workers from newly regulated sectors
to the unregulated ones, the welfare effects of involuntary unemployment, and the
heterogeneous effects of this policy on different types of workers.
There have been multiple attempts to understand and quantify the costs that
agents in the labor market face as a result of environmental policies.4 At the same
time, the majority of those existing studies use either a difference-in-differences ap-
proach, in which firms in the unregulated sector serve as controls; or partial equilib-
rium models that focus on the regulated sector, hence neglecting the cost of the inflow
of new workers into unemployment or the unregulated sector. Given these research
designs, it is difficult to measure precisely the overall economic effect of these regu-
lations on the aggregate labor market. Furthermore, with these settings, it is more
challenging to run counterfactuals to understand the impact of policies that have not
been adopted yet.
To be able to correctly quantify and understand the effects of environmental poli-
cies on the labor market requires a general equilibrium model that allows for interac-
tion between sectors. This dissertation aims to focus on the likely costs generated by
environmental policies such as sectoral reallocations and unemployment, to quantify
them and to analyze potential policies designed to alleviate the costs. This is consis-
tent with Walker (2011), who points out that the appropriate measure of regulatory
27 economics Nobel laureates, all the 4 former Fed Chairs, and 15 former Chairs of the Council of
Economic Advisers.
4E.g., Berman and Bui (2001), Morgenstern et al. (2002), Greenstone (2002),Christoph et al.
(2012), Walker (2013), Curtis (2014),Kuminoff et al. (2015), Hafstead and Williams-III (2016), inter
alia.
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costs to the workforce should not be characterized by number of job lost but by the
transitional costs associated with reallocating production or workers.
Additionally, to understand the potential effects, it is essential to consider a styl-
ized fact in the labor economics literature: that policies affecting a particular sector
or occupation which generate involuntary separations are time-consuming and asso-
ciated with substantial transitional costs.5 These costs are amplified if workers lose
their sector-specific skills and tenure, and are forced to switch to another sector, re-
sulting in significant and persistent earnings losses. These losses are even higher for
those who experience unemployment spells.6 Furthermore, most of the unemploy-
ment experienced following a sectoral shock can be accounted for by workers who
decided to continue searching in the same sector.7
Moreover, the displacement literature has studied whether unemployed workers
often suffer significant and permanent human capital losses, and if unemployment
spells persist, it generates that workers detach from the labor market. For example,
Ortego-Marti (2016) finds that the percentage wage loss for an additional month of
unemployment is 1.22 percent.
Furthermore, in the case of previous environmental policy, the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendment, Walker (2013) finds that industry-specific human capital plays a vital
role as a barrier to job mobility. In particular, the earnings losses for workers who
stay within the same industry are significantly smaller than for workers who change
industries. These earnings losses also reflect losses due to non-employment between
jobs that may also be higher for workers who switch industries.
In a recent study, Hafstead and Williams (2018) use an equilibrium search and
matching model to study the effects of environmental policies on the labor market.
5E.g., Jacobson et al. (1993); von Wachter et al. (2011).
6E.g., Kambourov and Manovskii (2008).
7E.g., Murphy and Topel (1987); Loungani and Rogerson (1989).
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They find that a carbon tax causes a substantial shift in employment between sectors,
but the net impact on the labor market is small, even in the transitions. Their model
provides a framework for understanding the labor market effects of environmental
policy on the total number of jobs created and destroyed. Nevertheless, their model
does not take into account heterogeneity and sectoral human capital accumulation
which are crucial for measuring the costs of reallocation, the duration of unemploy-
ment spells, and distributional effects for individuals with and without specific human
capital.
To overcome such gaps in the literature, I build a two-sector general equilibrium
model to study the mechanisms through which environmental policies affect the labor
market in both the regulated and unregulated sectors. My discrete time model builds
upon Pilossoph (2014) by adding sectoral human capital accumulation and erosion to
her framework as in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998).
The model economy consists of two sectors (or islands), each with many work-
ers and firms. Following Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1985)
(DMP), workers and firms in each sector face search and matching frictions resulting
in equilibrium unemployment. At the same time, the labor mobility between sec-
tors is similar to the mobility between islands in Lucas and Prescott (1974). A key
difference relative to the standard island models that have a continuum of markets
where sectoral shocks do not have aggregate implications, is that I have a discrete
number of islands. In particular, I have a two-island model, which implies that there
are important effects of sectoral shocks. Lastly, the worker’s sectoral choice prob-
lem is a discrete choice, so to describe worker flows as in Pilossoph (2014), I follow
Kline (2008), Kennan and Walker (2011) and Artuc et al. (2007) in taking advantage
of Type I Extreme Value Distribution assumptions on error term in order to derive
expressions for choice probabilities.
4
The model economy is divided into two sectors, energy intensive (or ”dirty”) and
non-energy intensive (or ”clean”). Following Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), I al-
low for learning-by-doing such that workers become more productive in their sector
while on-the-job. Longer employment spells are associated with a higher probability
of becoming high-skill-productive workers. When there high-skill workers lose their
jobs and become unemployed, they face the risk of losing their sectoral specific hu-
man capital during the unemployment spell. Similar to learning-by-doing, I assume
unlearning-by-not-doing, and the longer the unemployment spell, the higher the prob-
ability of unlearning.8 Human capital levels within a sector segment labor markets
implying that market tightness, and therefore job-finding and job-filling rates, vary
by sector and sectoral human capital.9 10
Workers are ex-ante identical, but become ex-post heterogeneous as they can
either accumulate sectoral human capital on-the-job or lose sectoral human capital
off-the-job. The heterogeneity amplifies the effects of environmental policies through
costly and endogenous shifts in their skills and sectoral composition. For simplicity,
workers’ sectoral human capital only takes two values, high or low.
A calibrated version of my model can be used to investigate the welfare effects
of a carbon tax on workers in the newly regulated sector. The model could also be
used to analyze if unemployed workers in the unregulated sectors become worse off
because of the incoming sectoral switchers. In this paper, I calibrate the model to
8In this paper, high-skilled, higher productivity and higher human capital are synonyms.
9 I follow Nakajima (2012) assuming that labor markets are segmented. In his paper, he pointed
out the difference in the average duration of unemployment across different income groups, and
the overall average job-finding rate is declining in the unemployment spell are consistent with the
assumption that workers with different productivity search in different markets and thus face different
job-finding rates.
10Davis et al. (2013) find significant heterogeneity in vacancy-filling rates across sectors.
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2014 U.S. manufacturing data. After imposing a carbon tax equivalent to the social
cost of carbon, I study how the model economy adjusts to a new steady state.
In particular, I measure how steady-state employment, unemployment, and wages
change in both sectors, and both levels of human capital, after the introduction of
the tax.
I find that under my benchmark calibration the total production decreases 3.64
percent change, increases total unemployment by 0.06 percentage points, reduces the
employment rate in the dirty sector by 2.42 percent, increases the employment rate
by 1.04 percent. Also, I find that there occurred substitution out from high-skilled
workers towards low-skilled ones. At the same time, I find that firms in both sectors
reduce the demand for energy as it becomes a more expensive input.
Also, I find that the model is sensitive to the degree of substitution between the
production of the clean sector and the production of the dirty sector as inputs of an
aggregate consumption good.
Lastly, I perform a policy experiments to fully explore the interactions between
the labor market and a carbon tax. I explore the effect of three alternative options on
the usage of revenue obtained from the carbon tax. I find that it is less distortionary
to rebate it lump-sum to all workers relative to rebate it to unemployed workers.
I organize the rest of the dissertation as follows. Chapter 2 presents the related
literature to this paper. In chapter 3, I develop the two-sector search and matching
model, which allows me to evaluate the effects of environmental regulations on the
labor market. In chapter 4, the calibration strategy is presented. I discuss the
baseline results in chapter 5. In chapter 6, I present a Sensitivity Analysis and Policy
Experiments. Lastly, chapter 7 discusses the primary conclusions.
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Chapter 2
RELATED LITERATURE
2.1 Labor Markets and Environmental Regulations
Smith (2015) recognizes that most of the research on the employment effects of
environmental regulations comes from reduced form studies. The author describes the
results of past regulations on particular industries at a certain point in time reflecting
the specific conditions that product and labor market were facing. This implies that at
best, we can measure the outcomes. However, this type of models make it impossible
to describe what will happen under new regulations, such as the carbon tax, and new
economic conditions, which can only be done through a structural model.
Some recent reduced form study examples that study the relationship between
labor markets and environmental regulations are: Berman and Bui (2001), who find
no evidence that local air quality regulation substantially reduced employment, even
when allowing for induced plant exit and dissuaded plant entry. Morgenstern et al.
(2002), combines a unique plant-level data set with industry-level demand informa-
tion, and finds that increased environmental spending generally does not cause a
significant change in employment. An additional 1 million dollars in spending in-
duced by the regulation generates a net decrease of just 1.5 jobs. Greenstone (2002)
finds that during the first 15 years of the Clean Air Act, 590,000 jobs were lost in
heavily regulated industries. Also, Walker (2011) finds that employment of polluting
sectors in newly regulated counties decreases 15%, and Walker (2013) finds that newly
regulated plants experienced, in aggregate, more than 5.4 billion in forgone earnings
for the years after the change in policy. Kahn and Mansur (2013) finds adverse effects
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on employment in counties that have air quality worse than the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards, in particular, for electricity-intensive industries, having a re-
duction of jobs equivalent to what would happen after an increase of 33 percent of
the electricity prices. Curtis (2014) argues that the unemployed and inexperienced
workers in this sector are further affected as the job opportunities in the sector are
decreased and wages are reduced. Sheriff et al. (2015) finds that the 1990 ozone
regulation reduced power plant employment without significantly affecting energy
generation. Yip (2018) obtains non-employment effects on high-educated and an
increase of unemployment and reallocation for low-educated in Canada.
As an alternative to reduced form analyses to study the effects of environmental
regulation on the labor market, Kuminoff et al. (2015) uses a partial equilibrium
model of residential sorting with full-employment that incorporates welfare effects
of job layoffs and finds that an average worker’s annual earnings would decline by
$5, 553 if they lose their job during a healthy economy state.1
Also, there have been some critical efforts from the computable general equilibrium
(CGE) literature to study the relationship between employment and environmental
regulation, but primarily these studies rely on a full-employment assumption.2 These
studies abstract from frictional labor markets and unemployment, which is an impor-
tant reallocation cost for workers.
1Smith (2015) is the introductory article of the symposium on Unemployment, Environmental
Regulation, and Benefit-Cost Analysis as a result of the October 2012 workshop sponsored by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Kuminoff et al. (2015); Bartik (2015); Rogerson
(2015) are research papers that were presented at the conference and are part of the symposium.
2E.g., Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1996, 1998)
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2.2 Theoretical Framework: Sectoral Reallocation and Search Frictions
Several general equilibrium models have been developed to understand frictional
sectoral labor mobility. Here, I discuss how my model relates to existing literature.
As I mentioned in chapter 1, my model builds upon Pilossoph (2014). As in her
work, my model relates to Lucas and Prescott (1974) in the way we model sectors as
islands.
Alvarez and Shimer (2011) extended the Lucas-Prescott model, including specific
skills to incorporate a cost for workers switching industries. In that paper, they show
that specific skills may lead to significant rest unemployment, which is similar to my
model.3 Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013) extend Alvarez and Shimer (2011) by
including aggregate shocks finding that rest unemployment is the most significant
share of total unemployment during the business cycle and frictional labor markets
within the islands. They segment islands by human capital and match quality, and
not by industry or occupation. Wiczer (2015) builds upon Carrillo-Tudela and Viss-
chers (2013) but their papers differ in the way the shocks are modeled and the way
the islands are segmented. He includes occupation-specific shocks and occupations
segment islands.
Rogerson (2005) also extends Lucas and Prescott (1974) by introducing an overlap-
ping generation model with sector-specific human capital, and finds that workers from
the sector affected by an idiosyncratic shock leave the labor market (non-employment)
and the increase of workers in the unaffected sector comes from new entrants to the
economy.
There is another related literature that uses models of sectoral reallocations with
3Alvarez and Shimer (2011) define rest unemployment as the unemployment caused by workers
waiting for local labor market conditions to improve, rather than moving to other markets.
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search frictions without islands. Phelan and Trejos (2000) builds on Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994), and finds that a single permanent change in the fundamentals that
determine the sectoral composition can generate a downturn. Tapp (2011) extends
Pissarides (2000a), and finds that after the persistent change in prices that differently
affect a particular sector there is significant adjustment cost to the economy through
the complexity of transferring skills between sectors.
Cosar (2013), using a two-sector search model with a small open economy, overlap-
ping generations, and sector-specific human capital finds that in order to match the
slow sectoral responses to trade liberalization search frictions alone are not enough, he
finds that sector-specific human capital is the most critical impediment to a smoother
transition.
2.3 Search Models and Environmental Regulation
Using general equilibrium search models to understand the effects of environmental
regulation on the labor market is a relatively recent approach in the literature. As
I mentioned in chapter 1, Hafstead and Williams (2018) use an equilibrium search
and matching model based on Shimer (2010), to study the effects of environmental
policies on the labor market. They find that a carbon tax causes a substantial shift in
employment between sectors, but the net impact on the labor market is small, even
in the transitions.4
Shimer (2013) extends Lucas and Prescott (1974); he shows that even considering
moving sectors is time-consuming, the optimal tax on the dirty good depends pri-
marily on the marginal rate of substitution between private consumption of the dirty
good and pollution.
4Hafstead et al. (2018), using the model developed in Hafstead and Williams (2018), compare the
results of a model with full-employment assumption relative to one that assumes search frictions.
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Sun and Yip (2019) extend Pissarides (2000a) to theoretically understand the
effects of an environmental tax and they find the conditions on the primitives under
which the tax generates higher unemployment.
Pautrel (2018) introduces health status and pollution to Shi and Wen (1997).
He demonstrates that assuming full-employment leads to an overestimation of the
positive impact of environmental taxation on health.
Aubert and Chiroleu-Assouline (2017) takes into account the heterogeneity of
workers similar to my model. But they differ in several important aspects. First,
they do not allow for sectoral human capital accumulation (types are fixed). Second,
only low-skilled workers are exposed to unemployment. Third, they do not explicitly
model sector, so it is impossible to study reallocation. Lastly, their setting is static.
To my knowledge, the model I present here is the first to take into account hu-
man capital accumulation, search frictions, and sectoral reallocation in the context
of environmental regulation. Accounting for all of these factors may be crucial for
measuring the costs of reallocation, the duration of unemployment spells, and distri-
butional effects for individuals with and without specific human capital. 5
5Kuralbayeva (2018) develops a model that introduces frictions as in Pissarides (2000b) to the
migration model from Satchi and Temple (2009) to understand the effects of environmental regulation
on migration and unemployment. This paper differs from the rest in the sense that it is intended to
study developing countries with informal sectors.
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Chapter 3
THE MODEL
3.1 Environment
Time is discrete, infinite and indexed by t ≥ 0. Throughout, I omit time subscripts
unless needed for clarity.
There are two sectors (islands) indexed by s ∈ {c, d} where d stands for dirty sector
and c for the clean one. Three types of agents populate this economy: A continuum
and ex-ante homogeneous risk-neutral agents of measure 1; a large measure of risk-
neutral profit-maximizing firms, and a government. Workers and firms discount future
payoffs at a common rate β.
A firm can be either matched with a worker or vacant and posting vacancies.
Each firm consists of a single worker production unit. Matched firms in each sector
produce a sector-specific good using labor and energy as inputs, and the d firms
differ from c firms in their energy intensity needed to produce. Also, their output
and profits depend on the incumbent worker’s sectoral human capital and aggregate
sectoral productivity As.
Workers can be either employed or unemployed.1 Also, all workers are hetero-
geneous in their skills because of unlearning-by-not-doing during unemployment and
learning-by-doing during employment. Within the sector, a high-skilled worker is
more productive than an otherwise identical low-skilled worker.
All new entrants to a sector start as low-skilled unemployed workers. Once they
1I abstract from labor force participation decisions. So in this context, I assume that all non-
employed workers are searching.
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find a job, they begin as low-skilled workers, and each period they can become high-
skilled with probability φlhs ∈ (0, 1]. 2 On the contrary, the employed high-skilled
workers who lose their jobs become high-skilled unemployed workers, and each period
they can become low-skilled with probability φhls ∈ (0, 1).
Employed workers’ wages depend on their human capital, and all unemployed
workers receive a benefit b.
Furthermore, there exists a constant return to scale technology that uses the goods
that each sector produces as inputs and combines them to create the consumption
good.
Lastly, the government charges taxes to wages of employed workers to pay the
unemployment benefits. The benchmark calibration assumes that the per unit of
energy tax τe is equal to zero, but in chapter 4.2.3, I performed experiments where
the revenue is giving back as a lump-sum transfer to all the workers, employed and
unemployed Ω.
3.2 Segmented Labor Markets in each Sector
As in any labor market with search frictions, a` la DMP, firms and workers have to
spend resources before job creation, and production takes place. Which implies that
filled jobs produce rents in equilibrium.
For each sector s, let λs denote the labor force size. The labor force will consist
of high-skilled employed workers nhs , low-skilled employed workers n
l
s, high-skilled
unemployed workers uhs , and low-skilled unemployed workers u
l
s. Thus, the total
labor force size on sector s will be given by:
2This assumption is similar to Kambourov and Manovskii (2009); Auray et al. (2017), where
worker can only be skilled in one sector at a time and workers aren’t allow to exert effort to increase
their skills.
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λs = n
h
s + n
l
s + u
h
s + u
l
s,where
∑
s
λs = 1
In sector s, there are two pools, one for high skill h and another for low-skilled
workers l. Implying the existence of four well-behaved matching functions, one for
each pool, that determines the number of workers and the number of vacancies search-
ing in each of them.
The matching function in the pool for workers of type i in sector s is given by the
Cobb-Douglas specification:
mis(v
i
s, u
i
s) = µs(v
i
s)
1−γ(uis)
γ (3.1)
where mis is the measure of new matches of type i in sector s; u
i
s is the measure
of unemployed workers searching; vis is the measure of posted vacancies; µs is the
matching effectiveness in sector s, and γ is the elasticity of the matching function
with respect to unemployment.
For convenience, I introduce the vacancies to unemployed workers ratio as a sep-
arate variable, denoted by θis =
vis
uis
. This term is also known as the labor market
tightness. Thus, in this framework, there are four market tightness measures, one for
each pool. By homogeneity of the matching function, the job finding and job filling
probabilities are a function of the tightness.
To calculate the probability of filling a vacant job I divide the number of matches
produced by the matching function by the number of job vacancies searching in the
pool m
i
s
vis
. Expressed in as a function of θis:
q(θis) = µs
1
(θis)
γ
(3.2)
Equivalently, I calculate the job finding probability by dividing the number of
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matches produced by the matching function by the number of unemployed workers
searching. Given the structure of the matching function, it is equivalent to the product
of θis and q(θ
i
s):
p(θis) = θ
i
sq(θ
i
s) = µs(θ
i
s)
1−γ (3.3)
Following Pilossoph (2014), taking from the Discrete Choice Literature 3, all
workers are assumed to draw a vector of sector-specific idiosyncratic taste shocks
n ∼ Gumbel(−ρν, ρ) every period. The shocks are independently and identically
distributed over time and across sectors. Also, as Pilossoph (2014), I interpret these
taste shocks as anything that might keep workers in a sector that is unrelated to
wages or the ease of finding a job.
After realizing their tastes, low-skilled unemployed workers can move to the other
sector. This assumption ensures both that there are always some workers who will
find it beneficial to change sectors, and that labor mobility is bi-directional, even in
the absence of the Carbon Tax.
3.3 Final Goods Market
I assume there is a consumption good that is a composite of the goods produced in
each sector. This aggregate good Y can be used as a utility index to calculate welfare
measures.4 Y is produced combining Yc and Yd as inputs using a CES technology:
Y = (aY χc + (1− a)Y χd )
1
χ
Throughout the dissertation, I will normalize the price of the aggregate output
(consumption good) to 1. a and 1 − a reflect the share parameter for the sector d
3See Kline (2008), Kennan and Walker (2011) and Artuc et al. (2007)
4It is important to mention that I am abstracting from benefits of reducing pollution.
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and sector c respectively. This implies that the final good is the numeraire and can
be used for, consumption, and to purchase energy at exogenous price pe.
Since the markets for inputs are perfectly competitive, their prices are:
pc = α(αY
χ
c + (1− α)Y χd )
1−χ
χ Y χ−1c (3.4)
pd = (1− α)(αY χc + (1− α)Y χd )
1−χ
χ Y χ−1d (3.5)
3.4 Sectoral Production of Intermediate Goods
In each sector, firms matched with a worker of type i ∈ {l, h} in sector s ∈
{c, d}, uses carbon-emitting energy eis, and the worker’s human capital to produce an
intermediate good.
f is(e) = ψ
i
sAs(e)
αs (3.6)
where ψis reflects the skills of the worker:
ψis =
 1 if i = lψs > 1 if i = h (3.7)
Firms differ between sectors in their usage intensity of carbon-emitting energy.
The firms in sector d produce using a larger fraction of energy compared to the firms
in sector c. (αd > αc).
The firms buys energy eis at the exogenous price pe and pays workers real wage
wis.
5 At the beginning, I set the per unit Carbon Tax τe to zero. The firm matches
with a worker with probability q(θis) defined in section 3.2. This model of production
5 While the final goods market is competitive, the labor markets within each island are subject
to standard search frictions; therefore, the determination of wages is through Nash Bargaining
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with an exogenous energy price is consistent with the assumption that the country
behaves as a small open economy concerning energy.
The country imports energy at a price pe in exchange for the final good with zero
trade balance in every period. This, of course, assumes that the energy price would
not respond to changes in demand caused by the climate policy.
Also, I abstract from the capital decision in the model as my main focus is to
understand the effect in the labor market. It can be incorporated similar to Pissarides
(2000b).
So, the total output in sector Ys, that is used as an input on the production of
the market good Y is given by:6
Ys = n
h
sf
h
s (e
h
s ) + n
l
sf
l
s(e
l
s) (3.8)
3.5 Firm’s Optimization
A vacant firm’s value equation V is , in sector s ∈ {c, d} searching for a worker
of type i ∈ {l, h}, represents the present-discounted value of expected profit from a
vacant job in sector s searching for type i:
V is (Λ) = −κis + βq(θis)EΛ′ [J is(Λ′)] + β(1− q(θis))EΛ′ [V is (Λ′)] (3.9)
where Λ = {nhs , nls, uhs , uls∀s} represents the state of the economy, κis is the unit
cost of posting a job vacancy. With the job filling probability q(θis), the firm matches
with a worker of type i and starts production in the next period, and with the
complementary probability, the firms continue recruiting. Notice that in equilibrium
6Which is consistent with an aggregate Cobb-Douglas technology by firm type. Lets define
E = ne. So F is(E,n) = ψ
i
sAs(E)
αs(n)1−αs , and F
i
s(E,n)
n = ψ
i
sAs(e)
αs = f is(e) which implies
F is(E,n) = nf
i
s(e)
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V is = 0, as free entry is assumed. From the latter assumption, the cost of posting a
vacancy is equalized to the expected value of filling the vacancy:
κs
q(θis)
= βEΛ′ [J is(Λ′)] (3.10)
This equation is typically referred to in the literature as the job creation condition.
The dynamic problem of the firm in sector s, matched with a worker of type l,
is to choose the optimal demand for energy to maximize their profits. The Bellman
equation is given by:
J ls(Λ) = max
els
{
psψ
l
sAs(e
l
s)
αs − wls − (pe + τ e)els
+ βEΛ′ [δsV ls (Λ′) + (1− δs)(φlhs Jhs (Λ′) + (1− φlhs )J ls(Λ′))]
} (3.11)
The equation can be divided in two terms: the first, is the firm’s current profit,
where the ps denotes the price of the good, As(e
l
s)
αs the output, wls is the wage paid
to the worker, pe the price of energy, and τe the carbon tax. The second term is the
expected value of the next period, which consists of the following terms: First, the
separation probability δs times the value of being vacant, denoting that the match
between a firm and a worker breaks and the firm becomes vacant. Second, with
probability 1 − δ, a firm stays producing, in which case with probability φlhs the
incumbent worker becomes high-skilled transforming the whole match in high type
next period, and with 1− φlhs the firm stays filled with the low-skilled worker.
Similarly, for the firm that has already matched with a high-skilled worker h in
sector s, the problem is given by:
Jhs (Λ) = max
ehh
{
psψ
h
sAs(e
h
s )
αs − whs − (pe + τ e)ehs
+ βEΛ′ [δsV hs (Λ′) + (1− δs)Jhs (Λ′)]
} (3.12)
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Where φs > 1 is the parameter that reflects the higher productivity of being
matched with a high-skilled worker, and which is the most relevant difference relative
to the first term of equation 3.11. Similar pieces give the expected value: the value of
becoming unmatched next period is the product of the separation probability δs and
the value of being vacant. And with probability 1− δs, firms stay in the same match
because their incumbent worker has the highest level of human capital.
Firms take their price ps, the prices of energy pe, wages w
i
s and tax τ
e as given,
so they buy as much energy as is necessary to maximize the value of the match. The
first order condition of maximizing firm’s problem J is with respect to e
i
s:
psαsψ
i
sAs(e
i
s)
αs−1 = (pe + τ e) (3.13)
Which implies that the marginal product of energy is equal to the marginal cost
of energy, yielding the following energy demand:
eis =
(psαsψisAs
pe + τ e
) 1
1−αs
(3.14)
3.6 Worker’s Problem
Turning to the decisions of the workers, let U ls, U
h
s , W
l
s and W
h
s represent the
value functions for each type of worker. First, the value function for a low-skilled
unemployed worker in sector s is given by:
U ls(Λ) =b+ Ω + βp(θ
l
s)EΛ′,′ [W ls(Λ′) + ′s,i]
+ β(1− p(θls))EΛ′,′ [max
{
U ls(Λ
′) + ′s,i, U
l
s−(Λ
′) + ′s−,i
}
]
(3.15)
where ′s,i represents worker’s i taste draw for the next period in sector s.
7 During
7In the next equations, using the discrete choice theory it becomes evident that the values do not
depend on i.
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this period the worker receives b unemployment benefits and Ω lump-sum transfer.
During the next period, with probability p(θls), she finds a job in sector s and receives
W ns , while with 1 − p(θls) she stays unemployed and can choose in what sector to
search next period.
On the other hand, an unemployed worker with h human capital in pool s:
Uhs (Λ) =b+ Ω + βp(θ
h
s )EΛ′,′ [W hs (Λ′) + ′s,i]
+ β(1− p(θhs ))φhls EΛ′,′ [max
{
U ls(Λ
′) + ′s,i, U
l
s−(Λ
′) + ′s−,i
}
]
+ β(1− p(θhs ))(1− φhls )EΛ′,′ [Uhs (Λ′) + ′s,i]
(3.16)
Equivalent to the low-skill workers, a h unemployed worker in sector s receives
the unemployment benefit b and Ω lump-sum transfer in the current period.8 The
next period, with probability p(θhs ) she finds a job, and with 1 − p(θhs ) she stays
unemployed, and with probability φhls her human capital erodes and she becomes
low-skilled unemployed worker next period and can choose in what sector to search,
while with 1− φhls she remains searching as an unemployed high-skilled worker.
Now, the value function of an employed worker of type l in sector s is given by:
W ls(Λ) =(1− τw)wls + Ω + βδsEΛ′,′ [max
{
U ls(Λ
′) + ′s,i, U
l
s−(Λ
′) + ′s−,i
}
]
+ β(1− δs)(φlhs EΛ′,′ [W hs (Λ′) + ′s,i] + (1− φlhs )EΛ′,′ [W ls(Λ′) + ′s,i])
(3.17)
where, during the current period the workers receives a wage and pays the ap-
propriate wage tax (1 − τw)wls, and the lump-sum transfer Ω. Next period, with
probability δs she loses her job and becomes unemployed, with probability 1 − δs
she stays employed, with probability φlhs becomes high-skilled and, with probability
1− φlhs stays in the same job.
8 In this version of the model, I do not differentiate unemployment benefit by worker type. In
the U.S., the unemployment benefits depend on a percentage of your earnings over a recent 52-week
period. For which I plan to differentiate them in future versions.
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Lastly, the value equation of a high-skilled employed worker in sector s is given
by:
W hs (Λ) =(1− τw)whs + Ω + βδsEΛ′,′ [Uhs (Λ′) + ′s,i]
+ β(1− δs)EΛ′,′ [W hs (Λ′) + ′s,i]
(3.18)
Again, the worker receives a wage wls, paying a proportional tax τw, and the lump-
sum transfer Ω in the current period. With probability δs, the worker loses her job and
becomes unemployed next period, while with 1−δs probability, she maintains her job.
In general, if a worker either stays or become low-skilled, she has to choose whether
to stay unemployed in sector s or move to the other sector s−. The probability that
a low-skilled worker facing reallocation chooses to move from s to s− is given by:
pimovs = Pr
(
U ls−(Λ
′) + ′s−,i > U
l
s(Λ
′) + ′s,i
)
= 1− pistays
which following McFadden (1977) reduces to:
pimovs =
1
1 + exp
(U ls(Λ′)−U ls−(Λ′)
ρ
) (3.19)
These probabilities arise from the assumption that is come from a Gumbel dis-
tribution, which implies that it comes from the standard Logit probabilities. The
move probabilities suggest that, on average, workers move in response to differences
in sectoral payoffs. Furthermore, we can write the value of a low-skilled unemployed
worker as a function of these move probabilities:9
U ls(Λ) =b+ Ω + βp(θ
l
s)EΛ′ [W ls(Λ′)] + β(1− p(θls))EΛ′ [U ls(Λ′)]
+ βρ(1− p(θls))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
(3.20)
9See Appendix A for derivation.
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Where the expected value of tomorrow changes a little bit. It includes the value
of finding a low-skilled job in s, the value of staying low-skilled unemployed in sector
s, and the option value of remaining in sector s. Similarly, I can rewrite the rest of
the value functions of the workers integrating out the idiosyncratic taste shocks, and
even rewrite it as a function of the moving probabilities as in 3.20. See Appendix B
for the alternative expressions.
3.7 Wage Determination
To determine the wages, I assume that a worker and firm split the joint surplus of
the match according to Nash bargaining. This bargaining is different for high-skilled
and low-skilled matches as their outside options differ.
For matches between high-skilled workers and firms, I assume that firms cannot
differentiate between high-skilled workers that come from unemployment and those
that gain productivity on-the-job, as they have the same productivity level. Hence,
once in the bargaining process, the only outside option they have is Uhs . Implying
that once they become high-skilled, they can not go back to the previous job as a
low-skilled worker.
For workers of type i, the only credible threat of not agreeing is unemployment,
and for firms it is to remain vacant.10 The surplus of a job filled with a worker in
sector s ∈ {d, c}11 is then given by:
Sis(Λ) =
W is − U is
1− τw + J
i
s (3.21)
The wage paid each period to a worker in an i-type match in sector s is assumed
to be set to split the weighted product of both the worker’s and firm’s net gains from
10Agreement requires that W is(Λ) ≥ U is(Λ) and J is(Λ) ≥ V is (Λ)
11Free-entry imply that V is (Λ) = 0.
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the match:
wis = argmax
w
[W is − U is]η[J is]1−η (3.22)
Where η is the worker’s bargaining power with η ∈ (0, 1) so that both sides have
an incentive to produce. Taking first order conditions for the maximization problem
imply:
W is − U is = η(1− τw)Sis and J is = (1− η)Sis (3.23)
3.8 Worker Flows
The measure of employed or unemployed workers of type i in sector s, in general,
consists of the sum of new workers arriving, plus the ones staying minus the ones
leaving.
In particular, the number of low-skilled l unemployed workers in sector s in the
next period are given by the sum of the low-skilled unemployed workers that did not
find a job and decide to stay in sector s, the previously low-skilled employed workers
that lost their job, and the high-skilled unemployed workers that received a negative
skill shock:
u′ls =pistays [(1− p(θls))uls + δsnls + φhls (1− p(θhs ))uhs ]
+ pimovs− [(1− p(θls−)uls− + δs−nls− + φhls−(1− p(θhs ))uhs−]
(3.24)
The measure of high-skilled unemployed workers in s in the next period is de-
termined by the measure of high-skilled employed workers that lost their jobs and
by the measure of high-skill unemployed workers who neither find a job or lose their
productivity.
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u′hs = (1− p(θhs ))(1− φhl′s )uhs + δsnhs (3.25)
The measure of low-skilled workers in s in the next period consists of two mea-
sures, the employed workers with low-skilled that neither lose their job nor become
productive plus the low-skilled unemployed workers that find a job.
n′ls = (1− δs)(1− φlhs )nls + p(θls)ult (3.26)
Lastly, the measure of high-skilled workers in s in the next period is the sum of
three measures of workers from last period: first, the previously high-skilled employed
workers that did not lose their job; second, the high-skilled unemployed workers that
found a job; and, finally the low-skilled workers who became high-skilled.
n′hs = (1− δs)nhs + (1− δs)φlhs nls + p(θhd)uhs (3.27)
3.9 Government
I assume that the government runs a balanced budget such that the revenues from
the taxes (wage tax, and carbon tax) are equal to the value of the unemployment
benefits b and lump-sum transfer (or tax) to all workers Ω:
∑
s
τ e(elsn
l
s + e
h
sn
h
s ) +
∑
i
∑
s
τww
i
sn
i
s = b(u
l
c + u
l
d + u
h
c + u
h
d) + Ω (3.28)
3.10 Steady State Equilibrium
Definition: Letting the final consumption good be the numeraire of this econ-
omy, given a set of constant exogenous parameters,{As, pe, δs, β, b, ψs, κis, η, γ, µs, φlhs ,
φhls , αs, α}s={c,d} a steady state equilibrium is the set of values {U ls, Uhs ,W ls,W hs , J ls, Jhs }s={c,d},
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moving probabilities {pimovs , pistayi} transition probabilities, wages {wps , wns }s={c,d},
prices {ps}s={c,d}, energy policies {eps, ens}s={c,d}, taxes τ e, Ω and τw, and allocations
{nls, nhs , uls, uhs , θls, θhs}s={c,d} such that, in both sectors:
1. Vacant firms post vacancies optimally, and producing firms choose the optimal
level of energy:
eis =
(psαsψisAs
pe + τ e
) 1
1−αs
2. The free entry condition holds for both sectors and both human capital levels,
V is = 0, which implies:
κls
βqs(θls)
=
psAs(e
l
s)
αs − wls − (pe + τe)els + (1− δ)φlhs κ
h
s
qs(θhs )
1− β(1− δs)(1− φlhs )
κhs
βqs(θhs )
=
psψsAs(e
l
s)
αs − whs − (pe + τe)els
1− β(1− δs)
3. Unemployed workers decide where to search to maximize utility so that move
probabilities satisfy:
pimovs =
1
1 + exp
(U ls−U ls−
ρ
)
4. Workers and firms split the surplus that maximize the generalized Nash Prod-
uct, implying the following wages:
wls =η(psψ
l
sAs(e
l
s)
αs − (pe + τe)els) + ηκlsθls
+
(1− η)
1− τw
(
b+ β(1− p(θls)− δs)ρ log(pi−1stay)− β(1− δs)φlhs ((difUs)))
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And for high-skilled workers, the wage is:
whs =η(psψ
h
sAs(e
h
s )
αs − (pe + τe)ehs ) + ηκhsθhs
+
(1− η)
1− τw
(
b+ βφhls (1− p(θhs ))ρ log(pi−1stay)− βφhls (1− p(θhs ))(difUs)
)
where difUs is defined as:
difUs =
η(1−τw)κhs θhs
1−η − η(1−τw)κ
l
sθ
l
s
1−η − β((1− p(θhc )) ∗ φhls − p(θlc))ρ log(pi−1stay)
1− β(1− (1− p(θhc )) ∗ φhls )
5. The intermediate goods market clears in both sectors:
Yc =
αY
p1−χc
= nlcAc(ec)
αc + nhcψcAc(ec)
αc
Yd =
(1− α)Y
p1−χd
= nldAd(ed)
αd + nhdψdAd(ed)
αd
6. Government maintains a budget balance following Equation E.2.
7. There is a stationary labor distribution of workers over employment states.
(Inflows = Outflows)
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Chapter 4
QUANTITATIVE STRATEGY
In this chapter, I first describe the data that I am using, and then calibrate the
parameters of the model using aggregate data on U.S. Manufacturing Industries. I
divide the calibration of parameters into two steps. In the first step, I calibrate
a group of parameters directly from the data series and previous literature. In the
second step, I use a method of moments to calibrate the remaining parameters jointly.
In the next chapter, I will present the baseline results of the calibration, the model
fit, and I use the calibrated model to measure the effect of implementing a carbon
tax in the U.S. on the unemployment, vacancies, and worker’s transition rates.
4.1 Data
I combine different data sources that I link through the North American Indus-
try Classification System (NAICS) codes to obtain enough information to calibrate
the parameters of the model. I use the Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey
(MECS) to be able to separate all manufacturing industries by their energy intensity,
obtained their size and energy consumption. I use the Quarterly Census of Employ-
ment and Wages (QCEW) and Current Population Survey (CPS) to collect relevant
data on aggregate employment. And lastly, I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), to capture heterogeneity between high-skilled and low-skilled workers.
To divide the manufacturing industries into two sectors, I follow the U.S. Energy
Information Administration, and I separate them into energy-intensive manufacturing
industries and non-energy-intensive manufacturing industries.
In particular, the energy-intensive manufacturing group of industries is Paper
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Manufacturing (NAICS 322), Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing (NAICS
324), Chemical Manufacturing (NAICS 325), Primary Metal Manufacturing (NAICS
331), Nonmetallic Mineral Products Manufacturing (NAICS 327), and Wood Prod-
ucts Manufacturing (NAICS 321). The rest of the manufacturing industries are
grouped to form the non-energy intensive ones. In table 4.1, I present the indus-
tries by sector.
Table 4.1: Manufacturing Industries by Sector
Clean Dirty
Code Industry Code Industry
NAICS 311 Foodn NAICS 321 Wood productd
NAICS 312 Beverage and tobacco productn NAICS 322 Papern
NAICS 313 Textile millsn NAICS 324 Petroleum and coal productsn
NAICS 314 Textile product millsn NAICS 325 Chemicaln
NAICS 315 Appareln NAICS 327 Nonmetallic mineral productd
NAICS 316 Leather and allied productn NAICS 331 Primary metald
NAICS 323 Printingn
NAICS 326 Plastics and rubber productsn
NAICS 332 Fabricated metal productd
NAICS 333 Machineryd
NAICS 334 Computer and electronic productd
NAICS 335 Electrical equipment and applianced
NAICS 336 Transportation equipmentd
NAICS 337 Furniture and related productd
NAICS 339 Miscellaneousd
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Notes: EIA groups these industries as
energy-intensive and non-energy-intensive. The subscripts d and n reflect if they are part of the
sub-categories durable and non-durable goods.
It is worth to mention that I abstract from non-fossil sources of energy such as
nuclear power and renewable energy. In the calibration, I only take into account
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the amount of carbon-emitting fuels. Throughout the dissertation, energy-intensive
is equivalent to the dirty sector, and non-energy-intensive to the clean one as all
the energy used is carbon-based, so producing using more energy generates higher
carbon emissions. This assumption seems like a reasonable abstraction because fossil
fuels have provided more than 80 percent of total U.S. energy consumption for more
than 100 years. In 2016, fossil fuels accounted for 81 percent of total U.S. energy
consumption.
4.1.1 Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey (MECS)
Using the 2014 MECS conducted by the EIA, I imputed the manufacturing value
added from the energy consumption per value added ratio and the energy consump-
tion values reported in MECS. 1 The value added in total manufacturing is 2, 401
billion dollars. From this, approximately 32 percent ($762 billion) can be attributed
to the dirty sector and 68 percent ($1, 627 billion) the clean one. Also from the
MECS, I found that the total expenditure for purchased energy from all manufactur-
ing industries in 2014 was $149 billion. The dirty sector expenditure was $110, 530
(74 percent), and the clean sector expenditure was $38, 582 (26 percent) in millions.2
Furthermore, the total consumption of energy in 2014 for the U.S. manufacturing
industries was 14,875 trillion btu. Of this, the clean sector consumed 19.1 percent
(2, 850 trillion btu) and the dirty sector 80.8 percent (12, 025 trillions btu). Lastly,
the average price paid by all manufacturing industries weighted by their consumption
share was 10.04 dollars per million btu. Table 4.2 presents the sample statistics:
1MECS value added slightly differs from the one reported 2014 Annual Survey of Manufactures
(ASM). The MECS and ASM are different samples selected from (roughly) the same frame (i.e., list
of establishments). The ASM sample size is 3 to 4 times greater than the MECS. The MECS is
optimized to get at energy variables, the ASM for economics.
2Shares over value added are used to identify some of the parameters in the next subsection.
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Table 4.2: Sample Statistics from MECS, 2014
Sector
Value Added (VA) Purchase Energy Expenditure (E)
Share = E/VA
Billion Dollars Percentage Billion Dollars Percentage
Clean 1,627 68% 38 26% 0.024
Dirty 762 32% 110 74% 0.145
Manufacturing 2,401 100% 149 100% 0.062
Source: 2014 Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey (MECS).
4.1.2 Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) and Current
Population Survey (CPS)
Using the NAICS codes, I connect to the QCEW to obtain the total employment
by sector. The 2014 annual average manufacturing employment is 12, 156, 536 work-
ers. Of this, approximately 20 percent (2, 430, 927 workers) is attributed to the dirty
sector and 80 percent (9, 725, 609 workers) the clean one. Furthermore, the total an-
nual wages on average in the dirty sector are 70, 278 dollars and in the clean one are
62, 975 dollars, implying that dirty sector pays 14.9 percent more than the clean one.
I use the CPS to obtain the unemployment rate by sector. I identify each industry
using the NAICS codes, and then I weighted over the size of each industry. The total
annual average manufacturing unemployment rate in 2014 was 4.9 percent. For the
dirty sector it was 3.8 percent and for the clean sector 5 percent.
Table 4.3 presents the sample statistics for both QCEW and CPS:
4.1.3 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
I use the PSID to be able to capture the heterogeneity among workers. This data
set provides me with additional information to be able to identify the parameters
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Table 4.3: Sample Statistics from QCEW and CPS, 2014
Sector
Annual Average Employment∗ Total Annual Wages∗ Unemployment+
Level Percentage Level Relative (D/C) Rate
Clean 9,725,609 80% 61,150 1.149 0.050
Dirty 2,430,927 20% 70,278 0.038
Manufacturing 12,156,536 100% 62,975 0.049
Source: *Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). +Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS).
that differ across high-skilled and low-skilled workers in each sector.
In particular, I use sectoral tenure as a proxy for sector-specific human capital.
I exploit the longitudinal structure of the data to obtain years of experience in each
specific industry. I take 7 years as the threshold to separate workers by low-skilled
and high-skilled. This is consistent with Auray et al. (2017), who also using the PSID,
finds that it takes, on average, seven years to start earning the same as the average
manufacturing worker.3 I study workers who are employed in any manufacturing
industry in 2015 and use their history of previous years to construct their tenure.
Even though the sample size is small (955 workers), I find that the relative values
are close to the ones of QCEW. For workers in the PSID, the clean sector represents
74 percent, and from it, 71 percent are low-skilled and 29 percent are high skilled.
The dirty sector represents the 26 percent remaining, from which 67 percent are low-
skilled and 33 percent are high-skilled. The average hourly wages in the dirty sector
are 34.20 dollars and in the cleans sector are 29.67 dollars, implying that workers
in the dirty sector earn 15.2 percent higher wages than in the clean sector. Which,
is in close to the 14.9 from the QCEW. Furthermore, the average hourly wage from
3Instead of using the average worker, I could have considered the median worker, I decide for the
former as it is a must common statistic. But, it raises the concerned because of the skewness of the
wages.
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high-skilled worker in the clean sector is 36.6 percent higher than for a low-skilled
worker. Similarly, for the dirty sector, the average hourly wage from high-skilled
worker is 86.3 percent higher than for the low-skilled worker. Using the same data
set, Ortego-Marti (2015) finds that on average, an additional month of unemployment
lowers future wages by 1.22 percent. Table 4.4 presents the sample statistics:
Table 4.4: Sample Statistics from PSID, 2015
Sector
Workers Av.Hourly Wages
Level Percentage Level Relative (D/C) Relative (H/L)
Clean 706 100(74)% 29.67 1.1526
Low-Skilled∗ 502 71(53)% 26.72 1.366
High-Skilled∗ 204 29(21)% 36.65
Dirty 249 100(26)% 34.20
Low-Skilled∗ 167 67(17)% 26.63 1.863
High-Skilled∗ 82 33(9)% 49.61
Manufacturing 955 100% 30.85
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics(PSID. *Low-Skilled is defined as worker with less than
7 years of experience in an industry, and complementary, High-Skilled if experience is more than 7
years.
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4.2 Calibration
4.2.1 Direct Calibration
Discount Factor (β): I choose a monthly discount factor of β = 0.996 which
corresponds to average annualized interest rate of 4 percent.
Matching Function Elasticity (γ): I set γ = 0.5 for both sectors following
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
Nash Bargaining (η): In an economy without wage taxes, Hosios (1990) prove
that if the Nash bargaining and the matching elasticity are equal, it guarantees ef-
ficiency of the equilibrium outcomes. I set η = 0.5 following what is usual in the
literature, but knowingly that the Hosios condition is not satisfied with taxes.
Probability of skill acquisition during employment (φlhs ): As I discuss
in the previous subsection, Auray et al. (2017) find that the time it takes for a
manufacturing worker to earn the same as the average worker is around 7 years, which
means 84 months. So, I set the probability of skill acquisition during employment in
both sectors to φlhs = 0.012, which implies that it takes, on average, those 7 years for
a newcomer to a sector to become ”experienced” in that sector.
Probability of skill depreciation during unemployment (φhls ): I use the
estimate from Ortego-Marti (2015), who finds that each additional month unemployed
lowers future wages by 1.22 percent. I calculate how many months it takes the skills
of a worker to depreciate in order to gain the initial wage which is around 26.5 months
for the clean sector and 52 months for the dirty one. So, I set the probabilities of skill
depreciation during unemployment equal to φhlc = 0.037 and φ
hl
c = 0.019 respectively,
reflecting the average time it takes worker’s skills to depreciate.
Unemployment Benefit(b): I set the value of the unemployment benefit to 0.2
as the OECD (1996) computes the average replacement rates across countries, i.e.,
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the ratio of benefits to average wages, and concludes that, whereas typical European
replacement rates can be up to 0.70, replacement rates are at most 0.20 in the U.S.
Cost of opening vacancies (κ): Following Pilossoph (2014), I normalized the
cost of opening vacancies κ = 1 as I have the same normalization issue as in Shimer
(2005): doubling κ and multiplying the sectoral match efficiency parameters by 21−γ
doubles sectoral job-filling probabilities, but does not affect the sectoral job-finding
probabilities.
Clean Sectoral Productivity and Gap (Ac): I normalized the clean sectoral
productivity Ac = 1, so the productivity I obtain for the dirty sector is going to be
relative to the clean one.
Energy Production Elasticities (αd, αc): I calculated the energy share of value
added in each sector, (PeEs)/Ys (where P is the price of fossil fuel, Es the demand
of energy and Ys the value added in sector s). Setting αd = 0.145 and αc = 0.024.
Final good parameters (a, σ): First, for simplicity, I assume that the final
good is aggregated following a CES technology where χ = 0.5, implying an elasticity
σ = 2. This number is the same that Pilossoph (2014) uses in her analysis. In chapter
6 I run sensitivity analysis of χ.
Labor tax (τw): The labor tax is τw = 0.25 which is approximately the average
marginal income tax rate on labor, combining federal and state income taxes.
Table 4.5 summarizes the direct calibration parameters.
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Table 4.5: Direct Calibration
Definition Value Source
β Discount factor 0.996 Annual Interest Rate r=0.04
γ Matching Elasticity 0.500 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
Ac Clean Productivity 1.000 Normalization
φlhs Probability of skill acquisition 0.012 Av. time: 84 months
φhlc Clean Probability of skill depreciation 0.037 Av. time: 26.5 months
φhld Dirty Probability of skill depreciation 0.019 Av. time: 52 months
η Nash Bargaining 0.500 Hosios (1990)
b Unemployment Benefit 0.200 OECD
κ Cost of opening a vacancy 1.000 Normalization
αc Clean Energy Elasticity 0.024 MECS
αd Dirty Energy Elasticity 0.145 MECS
α Clean Value Added Share 0.680 MECS
χ Final Good Substitution Parameter 0.5 Fix
4.2.2 A Method of Moments
I jointly calibrate the remaining six parameters {Ad, pe, ψd, ψc, a, δc, δd, ρ} using the
general method of moments. The moment conditions used to calibrate the parameters
are as follows:
To pin down the sectoral separation rates and the variance of the taste shock, δc,
δd, and ρ, I use the clean share of manufacturing employment which is 73 percent,
the unemployment rate in the clean sector of 5 percent, and the unemployment rate
in the dirty sector of 3.8 percent. The model analog to these moments are:
For the share of clean employment:
m1 =
nlc + n
h
c
nlc + n
h
c + n
l
d + n
h
d
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For the unemployment rate in the clean sector:
m2 =
ulc + u
h
c
ulc + u
h
c + n
l
c + n
h
c
For the unemployment rate in the dirty sector:
m3 =
uld + u
h
d
uld + u
h
d + n
l
d + n
h
d
Next, I use the difference in wages to identify Ad, ψc, ψd. The model should
be able to reproduce three facts: average dirty workers earn on average 15 percent
more than clean workers, high-skilled workers in the clean sector earn on average 36
percent more than low-skilled workers, and finally, high-skilled workers in the dirty
sector earn on average 86 percent more than low-skilled workers. The model analog
to these moments are:
For the relative average wage between the dirty sector and the clean sector:
m4 =
wldn
l
d+w
h
dn
h
d
nld+n
h
d
wlcn
l
c+w
h
c n
h
c
nlc+n
h
c
For the relative average wage between high- and low-skilled in sector c:
m5 =
whc
wlc
For the relative average wage between high- and low-skilled in sector c:
m6 =
whd
wld
The price of energy pe is determined from the ratio of energy consumption in the
clean sector over the dirty sector that is equal to 0.237. Where the model analog is
given by the following equation:
m7 =
nlce
l
c + n
h
c e
h
c
nlde
l
d + n
h
de
h
d
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Lastly, to identify the clean share parameter a in the aggregate production func-
tion. I use the share of value added that is equal to 0.68. Where the model analog is
given by the following equation:
m7 =
pcYc
Y
So, I minimize the distance, using the Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm, between
the moments implied by the model and the empirical counterparts:
6∑
i=1
(mdatai −mi)2
4.2.3 Carbon Tax
In the computational experiment, I analyze a carbon tax of $27 dollars per metric
ton of CO2. This value is an average of the social cost of carbon for 2015 calculated
by the EPA using discount rates of 3 and 5 percent, as I assume a discount rate of 4
percent.4 Additionally, as they reported the value in 2007 U.S. dollars, I correct by
inflation to convert it to 2014 dollars.
I follow Fried et al. (2018) strategy to calibrate the size of the tax in the model.
I calculate the empirical value of the tax as a fraction of the price of a fossil energy
composite of coal, coke, natural gas, and, residual and distillate oil in 2014 from
MECS. To do so, I follow two steps: first, I calculate the price of this energy composite,
by averaging over the price of each type of energy in 2014 and weighting by the relative
consumption. Second, I calculate the carbon emitted from the energy composite by
averaging over the carbon intensity of each type of energy in 2014, and weighting by
the relative consumption. This process implies that a $27 per ton carbon tax equals
4The social cost of carbon in 2015 for 3 percent is $31 and 5 percent is $11 in 2007 dollars per
metric ton of CO2.
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32 percent of my composite fossil energy price.
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Chapter 5
BASELINE RESULTS
In this chapter, I discuss the baseline calibration parameters resulting from the esti-
mation, the goodness of fit, and the results from the baseline simulations for different
levels of the carbon tax.
5.1 Calibrated Parameters
Using the method of moments described on the previous chapter, I calibrate the
following six parameters {Ad, pe, ψd, ψc, a, δc, δd, ρ}. The results of my calibration are
shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Calibrated Parameters
Definition Value
Ad Dirty Productivity 1.2021
pe Energy Price 0.0009
ψc Clean Productivity Gap 0.3388
ψd Dirty Productivity Gap 0.7283
a Share Parameter 0.6840
δc Clean Exogenous separation 0.0300
δd Dirty Exogenous separation 0.0237
ρ Variance of taste shocks 0.1612
From Table 5.1 it can be observed that the estimated productivity for the dirty
sector is 20.2 percent higher than for the clean sector. The model needs this produc-
tivity difference to reconcile the fact that the dirty sector pays on average 15 percent
higher wages than the clean one. To reflect the significant wage differences between
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high-skilled and low-skilled workers in each sector, the values of the gap parameters
are estimated to be 0.33 and 0.72, with the gap being larger in the dirty sector than
in the clean one. To explain the lower unemployment rate of the dirty sector, the
model’s exogenous separation rates are estimated at 0.03 and 0.02 for the dirty and
clean sector, respectively. Note that these estimates are close to the one reported by
the BLS for total manufacturing of 0.033 for the year 2014.
Also, to match the relative size of the sectors in the data, the model relies on the
variance of the taste shocks and the share parameter. While the first parameter
generates movement from one sector to the other independently of labor market
outcomes, the second establishes the relative importance of the clean sector in the
production of the final good.
Finally, the values of prices of energy required to match the relative demands of
energy, and to be consistent with the size of the sectors is low. This can be explained
by their joint calibration, as it helps match other moments that are conflicted. Com-
pared to the literature, for example, Fried et al. (2018) calibrate a price of 0.0025,
which is nearly 3 times larger than the one calibrated in this work.
5.2 Model Fit
In this section, I compare the fit of the simulated moments from my calibrated
model to the corresponding moments in the data. I report the values of the data
moments and the model generated ones in Table 5.2. In general, the model does
reasonably well in matching the moments from the data. Nevertheless, two moments
are hard to replicate with the model simulation. These are the proportion of clean
employment, and the wage gap between the dirty and the clean sector. This is
intuitive since, in the model, the main driver of the wage differential is the difference in
productivity. Hence, in the long run, workers should reallocate to the more productive
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sector, yet this is not in line with the higher proportion of employment in the clean
sector that we observe in the data. Thus, the model will need additional frictions to
reconcile both facts.
Table 5.2: Results from the Method of Moments
Moments Data Model
Unemployment Rate, Clean 0.05 0.05
Unemployment Rate, Dirty 0.04 0.04
Proportion of Clean Employment 0.73 0.68
(Clean Wage High)/(Clean Wage Low) 1.36 1.35
(Dirty Wage High)/(Dirty Wage Low) 1.86 1.87
(Average Wage Dirty)/(Average Wage Clean) 1.15 1.07
(Clean Energy) / (Dirty Energy) 0.24 0.29
(Clean Value Added) / (Total Value Added) 0.68 0.65
5.3 After-Tax Steady State Results
As described in the previous section, the benchmark calibration helps the steady
state of the model to reproduce stylized facts from the U.S. manufacturing industry.
In this section, I use the model to simulate the effects of introducing a per-unit-of-
energy-used carbon tax, on unemployment, total and by sector, employment by sector
and by human capital, wages and energy consumption.
Specifically, the policy scenario that I am considering is to impose a 27 dollars
per metric ton that represents the social cost of carbon as described in the previous
chapter. I assume the government uses the revenue from the tax on unproductive
expenditure. In chapter 6.2, I relax this assumption and explore alternative ways
to rebate the revenue. Also, I maintained all parameters constant to the baseline
calibration.
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Imposing a carbon tax distorts the optimal decisions of agents in this economy.1
In particular, it generates an increase in the production cost of all firms affecting the
demand for energy and labor. Even though the cost increases for both sectors, given
that the dirty sector is more intensive in energy, its relative cost increases, while it
decreases for the clean sector. As a result, the clean sector becomes relatively more
attractive.
5.3.1 Production
After imposing a carbon tax of 27 dollars per metric ton, total production of the
economy decreases by 3.64 percent, which follows from a decrease of the dirty sector’s
production of 10.75 percent, while the clean sector’s production stays nearly the same,
increasing only 0.45 percent.
The significant decrease of the dirty sector’s output is driven by two forces working
in the same direction. On the one hand, the carbon tax decreases the demand for
energy creating a reduction in the production per worker. On the other hand, there
is a decrease in the number of workers as they become relatively less productive in
the dirty sector than they were before the policy, so there is a reallocation of workers
across sectors.
As previously mentioned, the effect on the clean sector is minimal. On the one
hand, there is an increase in the cost of energy that reduces the amount that firms
demand, reducing the production per worker. On the other hand, their demand for
workers increases because the sector becomes relatively more important through the
substitution effect in the CES production function between dirty and clean intermedi-
ate goods. In general terms, the clean production also decreases, but always less than
1It is worth mentioning, that I am abstracting of the plausible distortions caused by the negative
externalities produced by the use of carbon-based energy that the carbon tax can help to correct.
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the dirty sector because of the substitution effect within the final good production.
Additionally, as the clean sector is less affected by the policy, the reduction of
total output of the dirty sector yields an increase in the price of the dirty good, which
implies that the price of the clean good decreases.
Thus, the policy generates considerable impacts on the economy and the welfare
of workers. The effect on total output is comparable to 18 percent of the size of the
effect of the Great Recession in the United States.2 Figure 5.1 presents the values of
production for different values of the carbon tax, these values ranging from 10 to 50
dollars, with the value of the social cost of carbon of 27 dollars marked by ×:
5.3.2 Energy Consumption
Imposing a carbon tax equivalent to the social cost of carbon reduces the total
demand for energy in the whole economy by 26.99 percent which follows from a
decrease of 27.59 percent from the dirty sector, and a reduction of 24.98 percent from
the clean one. These results imply that there exists a surplus of demand for energy
relative to the socially optimal by not pricing carbon correctly. Figure 5.2 presents
the percentage change in energy consumption for different values of the carbon tax,
these values ranging from 10 to 50 dollars, with the value of the social cost of carbon
of 27 dollars marked by ×:
As shown in the previous figure, the reduction in energy consumption is heteroge-
neous across sectors. The quantity demanded by each sector depends on the demand
per each type of worker and the number of workers of each type. To clarify this, I will
first describe the mechanisms through which the carbon tax affects the per worker
2The U.S. manufacturing sector decreased 20.2 percent between the last quarter of 2007 and the
second quarter of 2009.
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Figure 5.1: Production for Different Values of the Carbon Tax
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Notes: The figure displays the value of production of the clean sector, the dirty sector and the total
economy for different values of a carbon tax. The tax is given in dollar per metric ton of CO2.
Where × marks the respective values for the social cost of carbon at $ 27 .
energy consumption, and second, I will describe the effects on employment in the
following subsection.
There are two effects that impact the amount of energy consumed per worker,
a direct effect and an indirect effect. The direct effect is a result of a mechanical
connection between tax rate and energy demand as made evident in the optimal
energy demand, equation 3.14, for all firm types. This effect is higher for the dirty
sector as it is more energy intensive (αd > αc). The indirect effect is a result of the
equilibrium changes in sectoral prices. As I discuss in the previous subsection, there
is an increase in the dirty sector’s price, which counters the direct effect but is not
large enough to offset it. On the other hand, there is price reduction in the clean
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Figure 5.2: Percentage Change of Energy Consumption by Sector for Different
Values of the Carbon Tax
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Note: The figure plots the percentage change of energy consumption of the clean sector, the dirty
sector and the total economy for different values of a carbon tax. The tax is given in dollar per
metric ton of CO2. Where the × marks the respective values for the social cost of carbon at $ 27 .
sector, complementing the direct effect.
5.3.3 Unemployment and Employment by Sector
The policy increases the total unemployment rate by 0.06 percentage points, going
from 4.62 in the baseline economy to 4.68.
This can be explained by the fact that the carbon tax generates an increase on the
production cost for all firms, making the expected value for firms to post vacancies
in all pools less valuable, which affects the dirty sector more. From the job creation
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condition (equation 3.10), in equilibrium, the expected value decreases, implying
that the right-hand side of the job creation condition also decreases after the tax. In
general, firms will want to hire fewer workers since the expected cost is higher. Since
the clean sector is less affected, workers start shifting to this sector stirring the job
finding probability of both sectors. Given that the clean sector is less productive, to
restore the equilibrium, the value of the new tightness needed is smaller, making it
impossible to take all new workers as firms prefer not to post vacancies once the value
of posting is 0.
Even though unemployment increases more in the clean sector, there is also an
increase in the dirty one, as workers realize that the job finding rate is affected by
the movement across sectors, making some workers decide to stay. Moreover, not all
types of unemployment increases. Indeed, there is a decrease in high-skilled dirty
unemployed workers. This is because the value of posting vacancies in the low-skilled
pool is relatively less affected and generates a shift from high-skilled to low-skilled
workers. Table 5.3 and Figure 5.3 presents these results:
Table 5.3: Baseline Simulation Results: Unemployment
Carbon Tax uc ud u
τe = 0 4.95 3.89 4.62
τe = $27 5.01 3.94 4.68
0.06 0.05 0.06
At the same time, following a similar logic to unemployment, there is a reduction
of the number of employed workers in the dirty sector of 2.42 percent. This partly
becomes unemployment, and partly creates an increase of 1.04 percent of employment
in the clean sector. Figure 5.5 presents the values of employment rate for different
values of the carbon tax, with the value for social cost of carbon marked by × :
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Figure 5.3: Unemployment Rate for Different Values of the Carbon Tax
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Note: The figure plots the values of the unemployment rate for different values of the carbon tax.
The tax is given in dollar per metric ton of CO2. Where the × marks the respective values for the
social cost of carbon at $ 27.
Furthermore, as the effect for firms employing low-skilled workers is smaller, it
becomes easier to fill a job. This generates a shift of workers from high to low. Low-
skilled employment increases for both sectors by 3.62 and 0.42 percent in the clean
and dirty sectors, respectively.
These results hinge on the assumption that the final good is aggregated using an
elasticity of substitution greater than 1. Recall that in the baseline calibration I use
a χ = 0.5 that implies a σ = 2. Implying that the dirty and clean goods are gross
substitutes. An increase in the relative cost of the dirty sector generates that the
clean sector becomes more attractive as it uses less amount of energy as input. This
substitution effect within the production of the final good is important to understand
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Figure 5.4: Employment for Different Values of the Carbon Tax
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Note: The upper panels display values of the employment for each sector for different values of the
carbon tax. The lower panels display the share of employment for each sector for different values
of the carbon tax. Carbon tax is given in dollar per metric ton of CO2. Where the × marks the
respective values for the social cost of carbon at $ 27.
some of the results displayed above.
In the next chapter I conduct some sensitivity analysis exercises decreasing the
degree of substitution, hence putting this underlying assumption to test.
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Figure 5.5: Percent Change of Employment by Human Capital for Different Values
of the Carbon Tax
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Note: The left panels display the percent change of the employment for the clean sector by skilled
for different values of the carbon tax. The right panel display the same for the dirty sector. Carbon
tax is in dollar per metric ton of CO2. Where the × marks the respective values for the social cost
of carbon at $ 27.
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Chapter 6
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND POLICY EXPERIMENTS
6.1 Sensitivity Analysis with respect to the Elasticity of Substitution
In the benchmark calibration, I selected an elasticity of substitution of 2 (χ = 0.5).
This selection implies that I am assuming that the clean and dirty sectors are gross
substitutes as inputs in the production of the final good.
In this section, I investigate the relevance of this assumption, in particular, to
understand how it can affect policy predictions. As in the benchmark, I will discuss
the results from the policy scenario where I impose a 27 dollars per metric ton that
represents the social cost of carbon.
6.1.1 Cobb-Douglas (χ = 0)
I start by reducing the value of χ to 0, the Cobb-Douglas case, reducing the degree
of substitution between Yc and Yd as inputs of the aggregate production.
Before analyzing the computational results, I want to talk about the potential
implications of this assumption. Having a Cobb-Douglas technology implies that the
optimal expenditure share for inputs is constant. This, together with the implicit
assumption of inelastic labor supply and inelastic search intensity, after the tax,
changes the prices of the clean and dirty inputs, maintaining the total sectoral labor
demand almost constant.
Therefore, after imposing a carbon tax of 27 dollars per metric ton, the total
production of the economy decreases by 1.91 percent where production decreases
4.26 and 0.81 percent in the dirty and clean sectors, respectively. This reduction is
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smaller relative to the benchmark, due to the fact that the total employment stays
constant as it can be observed on panels (c) and (d) from figure 6.1. This smaller
reduction happens because of a similar decline in sectoral energy consumption.
But within the sector, similar mechanisms as the ones described in the benchmark
case occur. The total unemployment rate has a small increase of 0.05 percentage
points. Also, as in the benchmark, clean unemployment decreasing slightly more
than in the dirty. Furthermore, there is a substitution between the type of workers,
increasing the number of low-skilled ones.
Figure 6.1 presents evidence on the extent to which my results are sensitive to the
choice of χ.
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Figure 6.1: Sensitivity Analysis: Results for the Cobb-Douglas Case (χ = 0)
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Notes: In all panels, the dotted lines represent the benchmark equivalent graphs. Panel (a) displays
the percent change of the output, panel (b) plots the unemployment rates, panel (c) and (d) show
the amount of employment for each sector, and panels (e) and (f), present the energy demand by
sector, all for different values of the carbon tax. The carbon tax is given in dollar per metric ton of
CO2.
52
6.1.2 Gross Complements (χ = −5)
Now, I reduce the value of elasticity of substitution further, to 0.16, or equivalently,
reducing the parameter χ to −5. This entails that Yc and Yd are gross complements
in the production of the final good.
Let me first start by explaining the mechanisms that would drive the results of this
new parameter value. In particular, the complementarity implies that the optimal
expenditure shares for inputs is increasing as you need both goods to produce the
output, driving resources to the most affected input.
Imposing a carbon tax of 27 dollars per metric ton, decreases the total production
by 1.70 percent, which follows from a decrease of the dirty sector of 2.11 percent,
while the clean sector is also reduced by 1.53 percent. These results contrast to the
benchmark case, due to the complementarity of both sectors. Indeed, the higher
increase of the cost for the dirty is shared, which in turn has a smaller decrease in
the dirty sector, and higher one in the clean one, relative to the benchmark.
Surprisingly, the policy reduces clean sector employment. This reduction occurs
because it is optimal to shift resources to smooth the impact on the dirty sector,
causing an overall increase in the expenditure given by a decrease on the clean em-
ployment rate by 1 percent, and an increase of 2.1 percent in the dirty one. Similar
to the benchmark case, there is a slight increase in total low-skilled workers and a
decrease in total high-skilled ones. Also, the policy increases the total unemployment
rate by 0.05 percentage points.
As a theoretical exercise, lets imagine that I set the elasticity to 0 (χ = ∞),
the Leontief case, implying an identical change in both sectors as you need exactly
fix amount of both inputs. This thought experiment can be better visualized by
analyzing panel (a) in figure 6.1 and panel (a) in figure 6.2.
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As we can see, the effects on production and employment are highly sensitive to
the value of χ. Nevertheless, the effect on unemployment is pretty similar for all the
cases. Moreover, the selection of χ > 0 is in line with the sectoral literature that
assumes that sectors are substitutes. For example, I use the same value as Pilossoph
(2014). Nevertheless, in this particular case that considers manufacturing industries
where the energy intensive industries provide inputs to the non-energy intensive ones,
leaves room to question the chosen value. Thus, future research can help shed light
on the true value.
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Figure 6.2: Sensitivity Analysis: Results for the Gross Complements Case (χ = −5)
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Notes: In all panels, the dotted lines represent the benchmark equivalent graphs. Panel (a) displays
the percent change of the output, panel (b) plots the unemployment rates, panel (c) and (d) show
the amount of employment for each sector, and panels (e) and (f) present the energy demand by
sector, all for different values of the carbon tax. The carbon tax is given in dollar per metric ton of
CO2.
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6.2 Policy Experiment: Carbon Tax Dividend
I initially assumed that the revenue is used as unproductive expenditure.
Ω1 =
∑
i
∑
s
τww
i
sn
i
s − b(ulc + uld + uhc + uhd)
Ω2 =
∑
s
τ e(elsn
l
s + e
h
sn
h
s )
This is equivalent to throwing to the sea Ω2.
Now, let’s study two alternative cases. First, the government returns it in a Lump-
Sum fashion to all workers equally as a carbon dividend. This means each worker
receives a general transfer TGLS:
TGLS =
Ω2
ulc + u
l
d + u
h
c + u
h
d + n
l
c + n
l
d + n
h
c + n
h
d
which is just Ω2 since the population is normalized to 1.
In the second case, policymakers are concerned only about unemployed workers.
In this scenario, Ω2 is only returned to unemployed workers. This implies that each
unemployed worker receives:
TULS =
Ω2
ulc + u
l
d + u
h
c + u
h
d
In the first case, the optimal employment is equal to the optimal employment with
unproductive government spending. As it is standard with lump sum transfers, it only
increases the consumption of workers, but it does not affect the optimal decisions even
after the tax.
It is important to mention, that all workers are better-off relative to the bench-
mark, as they receive higher income no matter what their employment state is, trans-
lating into higher consumption. Therefore, overall welfare increases which counteracts
the effects of the carbon tax.
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As for the second scenario, the lump sum transfer to unemployed workers further
increases unemployment and decreases employment relative to the benchmark. Trans-
fers affect the outside option of workers, being unemployed, in the Nash Bargaining
problem they face with firms. This increases wages and decreases the labor demand
relative to the benchmark. Nonetheless, both, employed and unemployed workers are
better-off than compared to the benchmark, given that the wages decrease less for
those employed, while the unemployed receive a higher transfer.
Still, workers are worse-off as compared to the first case, due to the reduction of
job finding probabilities. Furthermore, despite the fact that the welfare of workers is
higher relative to throwing the revenue to the sea, the total economy suffers as total
production decreases. This leaves an open opportunity to studying better policy
alternatives.
Table 6.1: Alternative Carbon Dividend
Carbon Dividend uc ud u
Everybody 0.06 0.05 0.06
Unemployed 0.12 0.10 0.12
0.06 0.05 0.06
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
The shift towards a cleaner energy economy would improve human health and eco-
logical sustainability to the planet. However, this transition may have important
reallocation costs. I use as an example the implementation of a carbon tax in the
U.S. to show that environmental regulations may impose an important burden on
workers. Also, I propose parallel policies that can be used to ease these transitional
costs.
In this paper, I construct a two-sector general equilibrium search model with
human capital accumulation. I calibrate it to match the U.S. economy during 2014.
Then I implemented a carbon tax equivalent to the social cost of carbon estimated
at 27 dollars per metric ton.
I find that under my benchmark calibration the total production decreases 3.64
percent, increases total unemployment by 0.06 percentage points, reduces the em-
ployment in the dirty sector by 2.42 percent, increases the clean employment by 1.04
percent. Also, I find that there occurred substitution out from high-skilled workers
towards low-skilled ones. At the same time, I find that firms in both sectors reduce
the demand for energy as it becomes a more expensive input.
Also, I find that the model is sensitive to degree of substitution between the
production of the clean sector and the production of the dirty sector as inputs of an
aggregate consumption good.
Lastly, I perform a policy experiment to fully explore the interactions between
the labor market and a carbon tax. First, I explore the effect of three alternative
options on the usage of revenue obtained from the carbon tax. I find that it is less
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distortionary to rebate it lump-sum to all workers relative to rebate it to unemployed
workers.
A natural extension going forward will be to relax the assumption that the energy
used in the model is carbon-based. Moreover, it could be a composite of different types
of energy. The simpler way to implement this, is to re-scale energy by introducing
energy supply elasticities for carbon emissions of producers, to be able to identify
how the energy-intensity of energy generation will change with a carbon tax. So the
energy used in the model would be cleaner and will pay less carbon tax.
Another exciting extension would be to consider the well-known effects of pollution
on human capital. Taking some estimates from the literature, for example, from
Graff Zivin and Neidell (2012), on how pollution affects human capital together with
the relation between carbon dioxide (CO2) and particulate matter (PM2.5), and add
it to my model as a function of worker’s productivity as in Williams (2000). In
the benchmark calibration, this will decrease the productivity of workers, while the
introduction of the carbon tax would increase it.
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I begin with equation 3.15 that reflects the value of an unemployed worker in a
sector s:
U ls(Λ) =b+ Ω + βp(θ
l
s)EΛ′,′ [W ls(Λ′) + ′s,i]
+ β(1− p(θls))EΛ′,′ [max
{
U ls(Λ
′) + ′s,i, U
l
s−(Λ
′) + ′s−,i
}
]
Integrating out the future idiosyncratic taste shock, exploiting Type I Extreme
Value Theory, using the fact that the expectation of a Gumbel(−ργ, ρ) variables is
zero, gives:
U ls(Λ) =b+ Ω + βp(θ
l
s)EΛ′ [W ls(Λ′)]
+ β(1− p(θls))ρEΛ′ [log(exp(
U ls
ρ
) + exp(
U ls−
ρ
))]
Now, I add and subtract ±β(1− p(θls))EΛ′ [U ls] from the equation:
U ls(Λ) =b+ Ω + βp(θ
l
s)EΛ′ [W ls(Λ′)]± β(1− p(θls))EΛ′ [U ls]
+ β(1− p(θls))ρEΛ′ [log(exp(
U ls
ρ
) + exp(
U ls−
ρ
))]
I divide and multiple the minus part by ρ, and use a transformation that does not
change the value given the functions properties log(exp(·)):
U ls(Λ) =b+ Ω + βp(θ
l
s)EΛ′ [W ls(Λ′)] + β(1− p(θls))EΛ′ [U ls]− ρβ(1− p(θls))EΛ′ [log(exp(
U ls(Λ
′)
ρ
))]
+ β(1− p(θls))ρEΛ′ [log(exp(
U ls(Λ
′)
ρ
) + exp(
U ls−(Λ
′)
ρ
))]
Next, using the rule of logarithm that log(x)− log(y) = log(x/y)
U ls(Λ) =b+ Ω + βp(θ
l
s)EΛ′ [W ls(Λ′)] + β(1− p(θls))EΛ′ [U ls]
+ β(1− p(θls))ρEΛ′ [log(
exp(U
l
s(Λ
′)
ρ
) + exp(
U l
s− (Λ
′)
ρ
)
exp(U
l
s(Λ
′)
ρ
)
)]
Furthermore, I use the properties of the exponential function:
U ls(Λ) =b+ Ω + βp(θ
l
s)EΛ′ [W ls(Λ′)] + β(1− p(θls))EΛ′ [U ls]
+ β(1− p(θls))ρEΛ′ [log(exp(
U ls(Λ
′)
ρ
− U
l
s(Λ
′)
ρ
) + exp(
U ls−(Λ
′)
ρ
)− U
l
s(Λ
′)
ρ
)]
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As, exp(0) = 1:
U ls(Λ) =b+ Ω + βp(θ
l
s)EΛ′ [W ls(Λ′)] + β(1− p(θls))EΛ′ [U ls]
+ β(1− p(θls))ρEΛ′ [log(1 + exp(
U ls−(Λ
′)
ρ
)− U
l
s(Λ
′)
ρ
)]
Lastly, I use the definition of pistays :
U ls(Λ) =b+ Ω + βp(θ
l
s)EΛ′ [W ls(Λ′)] + β(1− p(θls))EΛ′ [U ls(Λ′)]
+ β(1− p(θls))ρEΛ′ [log(pi−1stays)]
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Similarly, I integrate out the future idiosyncratic taste shock, exploiting Type I
Extreme Value Theory, and using the fact that the expectation of a Gumbel(−ργ, ρ)
variables is zero, and rewrite the value functions:
High-skilled Unemployed Worker’s Value Function:
Uhs (Λ) =b+ Ω + βp(θ
h
s )EΛ′ [W hs (Λ′)]
+ β(1− p(θhs ))φhls ρEΛ′ [log(exp(
U ls
ρ
) + exp(
U ls−
ρ
))]
+ β(1− p(θhs ))(1− φhls )EΛ′ [Uhs (Λ′)]
Low-skilled Employed Worker’s Value Function:
W ls(Λ) =(1− τw)wls + Ω + βδsρEΛ′ [log(exp(
U ls
ρ
) + exp(
U ls−
ρ
))]
+ β(1− δs)(φlhs EΛ′ [W hs (Λ′)] + (1− φlhs )EΛ′ [W ls(Λ′)])
High-skilled Employed Worker’s Value Function:
W hs (Λ) =(1− τw)whs + Ω + βδsEΛ′,[Uhs (Λ′)]
+ β(1− δs)EΛ′ [W hs (Λ′)]
Alternatively, I can rewrite them, similar to the low-skilled unemployed worker’s
value, in terms of the probability of moving between sectors:
High-skilled Unemployed Worker’s Value Function:
Uhs (Λ) =b+ Ω + βp(θ
h
s )EΛ′ [W hs (Λ′)]
+ β(1− p(θhs ))φhls EΛ′ [U ls(Λ′) + ρ log(pi−1stays)]
+ β(1− p(θhs ))(1− φhls )EΛ′ [Uhs (Λ′)]
Low-skilled Employed Worker’s Value Function:
W ls(Λ) =(1− τw)wls + Ω + βδsEΛ′ [U ls(Λ′) + ρ log(pi−1stays)]
+ β(1− δs)(φlhs EΛ′ [W hs (Λ′)] + (1− φlhs )EΛ′ [W ls(Λ′)])
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W ls(Λ)− U ls(Λ) =(1− τw)wls + Ω + βδsEΛ′ [U ls(Λ′)] + βρδsEΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
+ β(1− δs)(φlhs EΛ′ [W hs (Λ′)] + (1− φlhs )EΛ′ [W ls(Λ′)])
− (b+ Ω + βp(θls)EΛ′ [W ls(Λ′)] + β(1− p(θls))EΛ′ [U ls(Λ′)]
+ βρ(1− p(θls))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
)
=(1− τw)wls − b+ βρ(δs − (1− p(θls)))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
+ β(1− δ)EΛ′ [W hs (Λ′)−W ls(Λ′)] + β(1− δ − p(θls))EΛ′ [W ls(Λ′)− U ls(Λ′)]
=(1− τw)wls − b+ βρ(δs − (1− p(θls)))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
+ β(1− δ)φlhs EΛ′ [η(Shs − Sls) + (Uhs − U ls)] + β(1− δ − p(θls))EΛ′ [ηSls]
J ls(Λ) =psAs(e
∗l
s )
αs − wls − (pe + τ e)Ase∗ls
+ βEΛ′ [(1− δs)(φlhs Jhs (Λ′) + (1− φlhs )J ls(Λ′))]
=psAs(e
∗l
s )
αs − (pe + τ e)Ase∗ls − wls
+ βEΛ′ [(1− δs)(φlhs (Jhs (Λ′)− J ls(Λ′)) + (1− φlhs )J ls(Λ′)]
=psAs(e
∗l
s )
αs − (pe + τ e)Ase∗ls − wls
+ βEΛ′ [(1− δs)(φlhs ((1− η)(Shs − Sls) + (1− φlhs )(1− η)Sls]
η(J ls(Λ)) =(1− η)(W ls(Λ)− U ls(Λ))
η(psAs(e
∗l
s )
αs − (pe + τ e)Ase∗ls − wls) =(1− η)((1− τw)wls − b+ βρ(δs − (1− p(θls)))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
+ β(1− δ)φlhs EΛ′ [Uhs − U ls]− βp(θls)EΛ′ [ηSls])
Define yls = psAs(e
∗l
s )
αs − (pe + τ e)Ase∗ls
wls(η + (1− η)(1− τ)) =ηyls + (1− η)(b+ βρ(1− p(θls)− δs)EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
− β(1− δ)φlhs EΛ′ [Uhs − U ls] + βp(θls)EΛ′ [ηSls])
=ηyls + (1− η)(b+ βρ(1− p(θls)− δs)EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
− β(1− δ)φlhs EΛ′ [Uhs − U ls] +
βηp(θls)
(1− η) EΛ′ [J
l
s])
=ηyls + (1− η)(b+ βρ(1− p(θls)− δs)EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
− β(1− δ)φlhs EΛ′ [Uhs − U ls] +
ηp(θls)
(1− η)
κls
q(θls)
)
=ηyls + ηκ
l
sθ
l
s + (1− η)(b+ βρ(1− p(θls)− δs)EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
− β(1− δ)φlhs EΛ′ [Uhs − U ls])
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Uhs (Λ)− U ls(Λ) =b+ Ω + βp(θhs )EΛ′ [W hs (Λ′)] + β(1− p(θhs ))φhlEΛ′ [U ls(Λ′)]
+ βρ(1− p(θhs ))φhlEΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)] + β(1− p(θhs ))(1− φhl)EΛ′ [Uhs (Λ′)]
− (b+ Ω + βp(θls)EΛ′ [W ls(Λ′)] + β(1− p(θls))EΛ′ [U ls(Λ′)]
+ βρ(1− p(θls))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
)
=βp(θhs )EΛ′ [W hs (Λ′)− Uhs (Λ′)]− βp(θls)EΛ′ [W ls(Λ′)− U ls(Λ′)]
+ βρ((1− p(θhs ))φhl − (1− p(θls)))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
+ β(1− φhl(1− p(θhs )))EΛ′ [Uhs (Λ′)− U ls(Λ′)]
=
βp(θhs )EΛ′ [Shs ]− βp(θls)EΛ′ [Sls] + βρ((1− p(θhs ))φhl − (1− p(θls)))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
1− β(1− φhl(1− p(θhs )))
=
p(θhs )
κhs
q(θhs )
− p(θls) κ
l
s
q(θls)
+ βρ((1− p(θhs ))φhl − (1− p(θls)))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
1− β(1− φhl(1− p(θhs )))
=
θhsκ
h
s − θlsκls + βρ((1− p(θhs ))φhl − (1− p(θls)))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
1− β(1− φhl(1− p(θhs )))
wls(η + (1− η)(1− τ)) =ηyls + ηκlsθls + (1− η)b− (1− η)β(1− δ)φlhs
θhsκ
h
s − θlsκls
1− β(1− φhl(1− p(θhs )))
+ (1− η)βρ(1− p(θls)− δs)EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
− (1− η)β(1− δ)φlhs
βρ((1− p(θhs ))φhl − (1− p(θls)))
1− β(1− φhl(1− p(θhs )))
EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)])
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W hs (Λ)− Uhs (Λ) =(1− τw)whs + Ω + βδsEΛ′ [Uhs (Λ′)] + β(1− δs)[W hs (Λ′)])
− (b+ Ω + βp(θhs )EΛ′ [W hs (Λ′)] + β(1− p(θhs ))φhls EΛ′ [U ls(Λ′)]
+ βρφhls (1− p(θhs ))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
)
+ β(1− p(θhs ))(1− φhls )EΛ′ [Uhs (Λ′)]
=(1− τw)whs − b− βφhls ρ(1− p(θhs ))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
− βp(θhs )EΛ′ [W hs (Λ′)− Uhs (Λ′)] + βφhls (1− p(θhs ))EΛ′ [Uhs − U ls]
=(1− τw)whs − b− βφhls ρ(1− p(θls))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)] + βη(1− δs)EΛ′ [Shs (Λ′)]
− βηp(θhs )EΛ′ [Shs (Λ′)] + βφhls (1− p(θls))EΛ′ [Uhs − U ls]
Jhs (Λ) =y
h
s − whs + β(1− δs)EΛ′ [Jhs (Λ′)]
=yhs − whs + β(1− δs)(1− η)EΛ′ [Shs (Λ′)]
η(Jhs (Λ)) =(1− η)(W hs (Λ)− Uhs (Λ))
η(yhs − whs ) =(1− η)((1− τw)whs − b− βφhls ρ(1− p(θhs ))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
− βηp(θhs )EΛ′ [Shs (Λ′)] + βφhls (1− p(θhs ))EΛ′ [Uhs − U ls])
whs (η + (1− η)(1− τ)) =ηyhs + (1− η)(b+ βφhls ρ(1− p(θhs ))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
+ βηp(θhs )EΛ′ [Shs (Λ′)]− βφhls (1− p(θhs ))EΛ′ [Uhs − U ls])
=ηyhs + (1− η)(b+ βφhls ρ(1− p(θls))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
ηp(θhs )
κhs
q(θhs )
− βφhls (1− p(θhs ))EΛ′ [Uhs − U ls])
=ηyhs + (1− η)(b+ βφhls ρ(1− p(θhs ))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
ηθhsκ
h
s
1− η − βφ
hl
s (1− p(θhs ))EΛ′ [Uhs − U ls])
=ηyhs + ηθ
h
sκ
h
s + (1− η)b+ (1− η)βφhls ρ(1− p(θhs ))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
− (1− η)βφhls (1− p(θhs ))EΛ′ [Uhs − U ls]
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To understand the importance of Human Capital, I have to compare two the
equivalent model without human capital. In this section, I present the most relevant
equations that differ from the model with human capital.
E.1 Firm’s Optimization
Vacant Firm’s Value Equation:
V i(Λ) = −κi + βq(θi)EΛ′ [J i(Λ′)] + β(1− q(θi))EΛ′ [V i(Λ′)]
Firm’s Value Equation:
Js(Λ) = max
es
{
psAs(es)
αs − ws − (pe + τ e)es
+ βEΛ′ [δsVs(Λ′) + (1− δs)(Js(Λ′))]
}
Optimal Energy Demands:
es =
(psαsψsAs
pe + τ e
) 1
1−αs
E.2 Worker’s Problem
Unemployed Worker’s Value Equation:
Us(Λ) =b+ Ω + βp(θs)EΛ′ [Ws(Λ′)] + β(1− p(θs))EΛ′ [Us(Λ′)]
+ βρ(1− p(θs))EΛ′ [log(pi−1stay)]
(E.1)
Employed Worker’s Value Function:
Ws(Λ) =(1− τw)ws + Ω + βδsEΛ′ [Us(Λ′) + ρ log(pi−1stays)]
+ β(1− δs)Ws(Λ′)
E.3 Wage Equation
wls =
ηyls + ηκ
l
sθ
l
s + (1− η)(b+ βρ(1− p(θls)− δs) log(pi−1stay)
(η + (1− η)(1− τ))
E.4 Worker Flow’s
Unemployed Worker’s Flow:
u′s =pistays [(1− p(θs))us + δsns]
+ pimovs− [(1− p(θs−)us− + δs−ns− ]
Employed Worker’s Flow:
n′s = (1− δs)ns + p(θs)us
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E.5 Government
∑
s
τ e(esns) +
∑
s
τwwsns = b(uc + ud) + Ω (E.2)
E.6 Job Creation Condition
κs
βqs(θs)
=
psAs(es)
αs − ws − (pe + τe)es
1− β(1− δs)
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I describe a plausible alternative moments to calibrate parameters related to the
matching function. As there is not data available for vacancies at the dis-aggregation
level of NAICS 3 digit subsector codes, I can use instead the labor shortages for the
manufacturing sector from the Quarterly Survey of Plant Capacity (QSPC). QSPC
is a survey that collects data on actual production and respondents’ estimates of full
capacity. ”Insufficient supply of local labor force/skill” is one of the answers that the
survey offer to answer why is the plan not operating at full capacity. Even though the
respondents can select multiple answers, I follow Tito (2018), interpreting the share
of respondents reporting ”insufficient supply of local labor force/skill” as a measure
of binding labor supply constraints in manufacturing. The weighed average labor
shortage in the dirty sector is 6.8 and in the clean sector is 7.3 percent. 1
Table F.1: Sample Statistics from QSPC
Sector Labor Shortage
Clean 7.2 %
Dirty 6.8 %
Source: Quarterly Survey of Plant Capacity (QSPC).
1I use the proportion of workers in each industry relative to the total in the sector as weights
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